Membership Inference Attacks against Machine Learning Models by Shokri, Reza et al.
Membership Inference Attacks Against
Machine Learning Models
Reza Shokri
Cornell Tech
shokri@cornell.edu
Marco Stronati∗
INRIA
marco@stronati.org
Congzheng Song
Cornell
cs2296@cornell.edu
Vitaly Shmatikov
Cornell Tech
shmat@cs.cornell.edu
Abstract—We quantitatively investigate how machine learning
models leak information about the individual data records on
which they were trained. We focus on the basic membership
inference attack: given a data record and black-box access to
a model, determine if the record was in the model’s training
dataset. To perform membership inference against a target model,
we make adversarial use of machine learning and train our own
inference model to recognize differences in the target model’s
predictions on the inputs that it trained on versus the inputs
that it did not train on.
We empirically evaluate our inference techniques on classi-
fication models trained by commercial “machine learning as a
service” providers such as Google and Amazon. Using realistic
datasets and classification tasks, including a hospital discharge
dataset whose membership is sensitive from the privacy perspec-
tive, we show that these models can be vulnerable to membership
inference attacks. We then investigate the factors that influence
this leakage and evaluate mitigation strategies.
I. INTRODUCTION
Machine learning is the foundation of popular Internet
services such as image and speech recognition and natural lan-
guage translation. Many companies also use machine learning
internally, to improve marketing and advertising, recommend
products and services to users, or better understand the data
generated by their operations. In all of these scenarios, ac-
tivities of individual users—their purchases and preferences,
health data, online and offline transactions, photos they take,
commands they speak into their mobile phones, locations they
travel to—are used as the training data.
Internet giants such as Google and Amazon are already
offering “machine learning as a service.” Any customer in
possession of a dataset and a data classification task can upload
this dataset to the service and pay it to construct a model.
The service then makes the model available to the customer,
typically as a black-box API. For example, a mobile-app maker
can use such a service to analyze users’ activities and query
the resulting model inside the app to promote in-app purchases
to users when they are most likely to respond. Some machine-
learning services also let data owners expose their models to
external users for querying or even sell them.
Our contributions. We focus on the fundamental question
known as membership inference: given a machine learning
model and a record, determine whether this record was used as
∗This research was performed while the author was at Cornell Tech.
part of the model’s training dataset or not. We investigate this
question in the most difficult setting, where the adversary’s
access to the model is limited to black-box queries that
return the model’s output on a given input. In summary,
we quantify membership information leakage through the
prediction outputs of machine learning models.
To answer the membership inference question, we turn
machine learning against itself and train an attack model
whose purpose is to distinguish the target model’s behavior
on the training inputs from its behavior on the inputs that it
did not encounter during training. In other words, we turn the
membership inference problem into a classification problem.
Attacking black-box models such as those built by com-
mercial “machine learning as a service” providers requires
more sophistication than attacking white-box models whose
structure and parameters are known to the adversary. To
construct our attack models, we invented a shadow training
technique. First, we create multiple “shadow models” that
imitate the behavior of the target model, but for which we
know the training datasets and thus the ground truth about
membership in these datasets. We then train the attack model
on the labeled inputs and outputs of the shadow models.
We developed several effective methods to generate training
data for the shadow models. The first method uses black-box
access to the target model to synthesize this data. The second
method uses statistics about the population from which the
target’s training dataset was drawn. The third method assumes
that the adversary has access to a potentially noisy version
of the target’s training dataset. The first method does not
assume any prior knowledge about the distribution of the target
model’s training data, while the second and third methods
allow the attacker to query the target model only once before
inferring whether a given record was in its training dataset.
Our inference techniques are generic and not based on any
particular dataset or model type. We evaluate them against
neural networks, as well as black-box models trained using
Amazon ML and Google Prediction API. All of our experi-
ments on Amazon’s and Google’s platforms were done without
knowing the learning algorithms used by these services, nor
the architecture of the resulting models, since Amazon and
Google don’t reveal this information to the customers. For our
evaluation, we use realistic classification tasks and standard
model-training procedures on concrete datasets of images,
retail purchases, location traces, and hospital inpatient stays. In
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addition to demonstrating that membership inference attacks
are successful, we quantify how their success relates to the
classification tasks and the standard metrics of overfitting.
Inferring information about the model’s training dataset
should not be confused with techniques such as model in-
version that use a model’s output on a hidden input to infer
something about this input [17] or to extract features that
characterize one of the model’s classes [16]. As explained
in [27] and Section IX, model inversion does not produce an
actual member of the model’s training dataset, nor, given a
record, does it infer whether this record was in the training
dataset. By contrast, the membership inference problem we
study in this paper is essentially the same as the well-known
problem of identifying the presence of an individual’s data in a
mixed pool given some statistics about the pool [3], [15], [21],
[29]. In our case, however, the goal is to infer membership
given a black-box API to a model of unknown structure, as
opposed to explicit statistics.
Our experimental results show that models created using
machine-learning-as-a-service platforms can leak a lot of in-
formation about their training datasets. For multi-class clas-
sification models trained on 10,000-record retail transaction
datasets using Google’s and Amazon’s services in default
configurations, our membership inference achieves median
accuracy of 94% and 74%, respectively. Even if we make
no prior assumptions about the distribution of the target
model’s training data and use fully synthetic data for our
shadow models, the accuracy of membership inference against
Google-trained models is 90%. Our results for the Texas
hospital discharge dataset (over 70% accuracy) indicate that
membership inference can present a risk to health-care datasets
if these datasets are used to train machine learning models
and access to the resulting models is open to the public.
Membership in such datasets is highly sensitive.
We discuss the root causes that make these attacks possi-
ble and quantitatively compare mitigation strategies such as
limiting the model’s predictions to top k classes, decreasing
the precision of the prediction vector, increasing its entropy,
or using regularization while training the model.
In summary, this paper demonstrates and quantifies the
problem of machine learning models leaking information
about their training datasets. To create our attack models, we
developed a new shadow learning technique that works with
minimal knowledge about the target model and its training
dataset. Finally, we quantify how the leakage of membership
information is related to model overfitting.
II. MACHINE LEARNING BACKGROUND
Machine learning algorithms help us better understand and
analyze complex data. When the model is created using
unsupervised training, the objective is to extract useful features
from the unlabeled data and build a model that explains its
hidden structure. When the model is created using supervised
training, which is the focus of this paper, the training records
(as inputs of the model) are assigned labels or scores (as
outputs of the model). The goal is to learn the relationship
between the data and the labels and construct a model that can
generalize to data records beyond the training set [19]. Model-
training algorithms aim to minimize the model’s prediction er-
ror on the training dataset and thus may overfit to this dataset,
producing models that perform better on the training inputs
than on the inputs drawn from the same population but not
used during the training. Many regularization techniques have
been proposed to prevent models from becoming overfitted
to their training datasets while minimizing their prediction
error [19].
Supervised training is often used for classification and other
prediction tasks. For example, a retailer may train a model
that predicts a customer’s shopping style in order to offer her
suitable incentives, while a medical researcher may train a
model to predict which treatment is most likely to succeed
given a patient’s clinical symptoms or genetic makeup.
Machine learning as a service. Major Internet companies
now offer machine learning as a service on their cloud
platforms. Examples include Google Prediction API,1 Amazon
Machine Learning (Amazon ML),2 Microsoft Azure Machine
Learning (Azure ML),3 and BigML.4
These platforms provide simple APIs for uploading the data
and for training and querying models, thus making machine
learning technologies available to any customer. For example,
a developer may create an app that gathers data from users,
uploads it into the cloud platform to train a model (or update
an existing model with new data), and then uses the model’s
predictions inside the app to improve its features or better
interact with the users. Some platforms even envision data
holders training a model and then sharing it with others
through the platform’s API for profit.5
The details of the models and the training algorithms are
hidden from the data owners. The type of the model may be
chosen by the service adaptively, depending on the data and
perhaps accuracy on validation subsets. Service providers do
not warn customers about the consequences of overfitting and
provide little or no control over regularization. For example,
Google Prediction API hides all details, while Amazon ML
provides only a very limited set of pre-defined options (L1- or
L2-norm regularization). The models cannot be downloaded
and are accessed only through the service’s API. Service
providers derive revenue mainly by charging customers for
queries through this API. Therefore, we treat “machine learn-
ing as a service” as a black box. All inference attacks we
demonstrate in this paper are performed entirely through the
services’ standard APIs.
III. PRIVACY IN MACHINE LEARNING
Before dealing with inference attacks, we need to define
what privacy means in the context of machine learning or,
1https://cloud.google.com/prediction
2https://aws.amazon.com/machine-learning
3https://studio.azureml.net
4https://bigml.com
5https://cloud.google.com/prediction/docs/gallery
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alternatively, what it means for a machine learning model to
breach privacy.
A. Inference about members of the population
A plausible notion of privacy, known in statistical disclosure
control as the “Dalenius desideratum,” states that the model
should reveal no more about the input to which it is applied
than would have been known about this input without applying
the model. This cannot be achieved by any useful model [14].
A related notion of privacy appears in prior work on model
inversion [17]: a privacy breach occurs if an adversary can
use the model’s output to infer the values of unintended
(sensitive) attributes used as input to the model. As observed
in [27], it may not be possible to prevent this “breach” if
the model is based on statistical facts about the population.
For example, suppose that training the model has uncovered
a high correlation between a person’s externally observable
phenotype features and their genetic predisposition to a certain
disease. This correlation is now a publicly known scientific
fact that allows anyone to infer information about the person’s
genome after observing that person.
Critically, this correlation applies to all members of a given
population. Therefore, the model breaches “privacy” not just of
the people whose data was used to create the model, but also of
other people from the same population, even those whose data
was not used and whose identities may not even be known to
the model’s creator (i.e., this is “spooky action at a distance”).
Valid models generalize, i.e., they make accurate predictions
on inputs that were not part of their training datasets. This
means that the creator of a generalizable model cannot do
anything to protect “privacy” as defined above because the
correlations on which the model is based—and the inferences
that these correlations enable—hold for the entire population,
regardless of how the training sample was chosen or how the
model was created from this sample.
B. Inference about members of the training dataset
To bypass the difficulties inherent in defining and protecting
privacy of the entire population, we focus on protecting privacy
of the individuals whose data was used to train the model. This
motivation is closely related to the original goals of differential
privacy [13].
Of course, members of the training dataset are members
of the population, too. We investigate what the model reveals
about them beyond what it reveals about an arbitrary member
of the population. Our ultimate goal is to measure the mem-
bership risk that a person incurs if they allow their data to be
used to train a model.
The basic attack in this setting is membership inference,
i.e., determining whether a given data record was part of the
model’s training dataset or not. When a record is fully known
to the adversary, learning that it was used to train a particular
model is an indication of information leakage through the
model. In some cases, it can directly lead to a privacy breach.
For example, knowing that a certain patient’s clinical record
was used to train a model associated with a disease (e.g, to
determine the appropriate medicine dosage or to discover the
genetic basis of the disease) can reveal that the patient has this
disease.
We investigate the membership inference problem in the
black-box scenario where the adversary can only supply inputs
to the model and receive the model’s output(s). In some
situations, the model is available to the adversary indirectly.
For example, an app developer may use a machine-learning
service to construct a model from the data collected by the app
and have the app make API calls to the resulting model. In this
case, the adversary would supply inputs to the app (rather than
directly to the model) and receive the app’s outputs (which are
based on the model’s outputs). The details of internal model
usage vary significantly from app to app. For simplicity and
generality, we will assume that the adversary directly supplies
inputs to and receives outputs from the black-box model.
IV. PROBLEM STATEMENT
Consider a set of labeled data records sampled from some
population and partitioned into classes. We assume that a
machine learning algorithm is used to train a classification
model that captures the relationship between the content of
the data records and their labels.
For any input data record, the model outputs the prediction
vector of probabilities, one per class, that the record belongs
to a certain class. We will also refer to these probabilities
as confidence values. The class with the highest confidence
value is selected as the predicted label for the data record.
The accuracy of the model is evaluated by measuring how it
generalizes beyond its training set and predicts the labels of
other data records from the same population.
We assume that the attacker has query access to the model
and can obtain the model’s prediction vector on any data
record. The attacker knows the format of the inputs and
outputs of the model, including their number and the range of
values they can take. We also assume that the attacker either
(1) knows the type and architecture of the machine learning
model, as well as the training algorithm, or (2) has black-box
access to a machine learning oracle (e.g., a “machine learning
as a service” platform) that was used to train the model. In
the latter case, the attacker does not know a priori the model’s
structure or meta-parameters.
The attacker may have some background knowledge about
the population from which the target model’s training dataset
was drawn. For example, he may have independently drawn
samples from the population, disjoint from the target model’s
training dataset. Alternatively, the attacker may know some
general statistics about the population, for example, the
marginal distribution of feature values.
The setting for our inference attack is as follows. The
attacker is given a data record and black-box query access
to the target model. The attack succeeds if the attacker can
correctly determine whether this data record was part of the
model’s training dataset or not. The standard metrics for attack
accuracy are precision (what fraction of records inferred as
members are indeed members of the training dataset) and
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(data record, class label) Target Model
Attack Model
data ∈ training set ?
predict(data)
label
prediction
Fig. 1: Membership inference attack in the black-box setting. The
attacker queries the target model with a data record and obtains
the model’s prediction on that record. The prediction is a vector of
probabilities, one per class, that the record belongs to a certain class.
This prediction vector, along with the label of the target record, is
passed to the attack model, which infers whether the record was in
or out of the target model’s training dataset.
ML API
Private Training Set Target Model
Shadow Training Set 1 Shadow Model 1
Shadow Training Set 2 Shadow Model 2
..
.
..
.
Shadow Training Set k Shadow Model k
train()
train()
train()
train()
Fig. 2: Training shadow models using the same machine learning
platform as was used to train the target model. The training datasets
of the target and shadow models have the same format but are disjoint.
The training datasets of the shadow models may overlap. All models’
internal parameters are trained independently.
recall (what fraction of the training dataset’s members are
correctly inferred as members by the attacker).
V. MEMBERSHIP INFERENCE
A. Overview of the attack
Our membership inference attack exploits the observation
that machine learning models often behave differently on the
data that they were trained on versus the data that they “see”
for the first time. Overfitting is a common reason but not the
only one (see Section VII). The objective of the attacker is to
construct an attack model that can recognize such differences
in the target model’s behavior and use them to distinguish
members from non-members of the target model’s training
dataset based solely on the target model’s output.
Our attack model is a collection of models, one for each
output class of the target model. This increases accuracy of the
attack because the target model produces different distributions
over its output classes depending on the input’s true class.
To train our attack model, we build multiple “shadow”
models intended to behave similarly to the target model. In
contrast to the target model, we know the ground truth for each
shadow model, i.e., whether a given record was in its training
dataset or not. Therefore, we can use supervised training on
the inputs and the corresponding outputs (each labeled “in” or
“out”) of the shadow models to teach the attack model how to
distinguish the shadow models’ outputs on members of their
training datasets from their outputs on non-members.
Formally, let ftarget() be the target model, and let Dtraintarget
be its private training dataset which contains labeled data
records (x{i}, y{i})target. A data record x
{i}
target is the input to
the model, and y{i}target is the true label that can take values
from a set of classes of size ctarget. The output of the target
model is a probability vector of size ctarget. The elements of
this vector are in [0, 1] and sum up to 1.
Let fattack() be the attack model. Its input xattack is com-
posed of a correctly labeled record and a prediction vector
of size ctarget. Since the goal of the attack is decisional
membership inference, the attack model is a binary classifier
with two output classes, “in” and “out.”
Figure 1 illustrates our end-to-end attack process. For a
labeled record (x, y), we use the target model to compute
the prediction vector y = ftarget(x). The distribution of y
(classification confidence values) depends heavily on the true
class of x. This is why we pass the true label y of x in
addition to the model’s prediction vector y to the attack
model. Given how the probabilities in y are distributed around
y, the attack model computes the membership probability
Pr{(x, y) ∈ Dtraintarget}, i.e., the probability that ((x, y),y)
belongs to the “in” class or, equivalently, that x is in the
training dataset of ftarget().
The main challenge is how to train the attack model to
distinguish members from non-members of the target model’s
training dataset when the attacker has no information about the
internal parameters of the target model and only limited query
access to it through the public API. To solve this conundrum,
we developed a shadow training technique that lets us train
the attack model on proxy targets for which we do know the
training dataset and can thus perform supervised training.
B. Shadow models
The attacker creates k shadow models f ishadow(). Each
shadow model i is trained on a dataset Dtrain
shadow i
of the same
format as and distributed similarly to the target model’s train-
ing dataset. These shadow training datasets can be generated
using one of methods described in Section V-C. We assume
that the datasets used for training the shadow models are
disjoint from the private dataset used to train the target model
(∀i,Dtrain
shadow i
∩ Dtraintarget = ∅). This is the worst case for the
attacker; the attack will perform even better if the training
datasets happen to overlap.
The shadow models must be trained in a similar way to
the target model. This is easy if the target’s training algorithm
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Algorithm 1 Data synthesis using the target model
1: procedure SYNTHESIZE(class : c)
2: x← RANDRECORD(.) . initialize a record randomly
3: y∗c ← 0
4: j ← 0
5: k ← kmax
6: for iteration = 1 · · · itermax do
7: y← ftarget(x) . query the target model
8: if yc ≥ y∗c then . accept the record
9: if yc > confmin and c = argmax(y) then
10: if rand() < yc then . sample
11: return x . synthetic data
12: end if
13: end if
14: x∗ ← x
15: y∗c ← yc
16: j ← 0
17: else
18: j ← j + 1
19: if j > rejmax then . many consecutive rejects
20: k ← max(kmin, dk/2e)
21: j ← 0
22: end if
23: end if
24: x← RANDRECORD(x∗, k) . randomize k features
25: end for
26: return ⊥ . failed to synthesize
27: end procedure
(e.g., neural networks, SVM, logistic regression) and model
structure (e.g., the wiring of a neural network) are known.
Machine learning as a service is more challenging. Here the
type and structure of the target model are not known, but
the attacker can use exactly the same service (e.g., Google
Prediction API) to train the shadow model as was used to
train the target model—see Figure 2.
The more shadow models, the more accurate the attack
model will be. As described in Section V-D, the attack model
is trained to recognize differences in shadow models’ behavior
when these models operate on inputs from their own training
datasets versus inputs they did not encounter during training.
Therefore, more shadow models provide more training fodder
for the attack model.
C. Generating training data for shadow models
To train shadow models, the attacker needs training data
that is distributed similarly to the target model’s training data.
We developed several methods for generating such data.
Model-based synthesis. If the attacker does not have real
training data nor any statistics about its distribution, he can
generate synthetic training data for the shadow models using
the target model itself. The intuition is that records that are
classified by the target model with high confidence should
be statistically similar to the target’s training dataset and thus
provide good fodder for shadow models.
The synthesis process runs in two phases: (1) search, using
a hill-climbing algorithm, the space of possible data records
to find inputs that are classified by the target model with high
confidence; (2) sample synthetic data from these records. After
this process synthesizes a record, the attacker can repeat it until
the training dataset for shadow models is full.
See Algorithm 1 for the pseudocode of our synthesis
procedure. First, fix class c for which the attacker wants to
generate synthetic data. The first phase is an iterative process.
Start by randomly initializing a data record x. Assuming that
the attacker knows only the syntactic format of data records,
sample the value for each feature uniformly at random from
among all possible values of that feature. In each iteration,
propose a new record. A proposed record is accepted only
if it increases the hill-climbing objective: the probability of
being classified by the target model as class c.
Each iteration involves proposing a new candidate record by
changing k randomly selected features of the latest accepted
record x∗. This is done by flipping binary features or resam-
pling new values for features of other types. We initialize k to
kmax and divide it by 2 when rejmax subsequent proposals
are rejected. This controls the diameter of search around the
accepted record in order to propose a new record. We set the
minimum value of k to kmin. This controls the speed of the
search for new records with a potentially higher classification
probability yc.
The second, sampling phase starts when the target model’s
probability yc that the proposed data record is classified as
belonging to class c is larger than the probabilities for all
other classes and also larger than a threshold confmin. This
ensures that the predicted label for the record is c, and that the
target model is sufficiently confident in its label prediction. We
select such record for the synthetic dataset with probability y∗c
and, if selection fails, repeat until a record is selected.
This synthesis procedure works only if the adversary can
efficiently explore the space of possible inputs and discover
inputs that are classified by the target model with high confi-
dence. For example, it may not work if the inputs are high-
resolution images and the target model performs a complex
image classification task.
Statistics-based synthesis. The attacker may have some statis-
tical information about the population from which the target
model’s training data was drawn. For example, the attacker
may have prior knowledge of the marginal distributions of
different features. In our experiments, we generate synthetic
training records for the shadow models by independently
sampling the value of each feature from its own marginal
distribution. The resulting attack models are very effective.
Noisy real data. The attacker may have access to some data
that is similar to the target model’s training data and can be
considered as a “noisy” version thereof. In our experiments
with location datasets, we simulate this by flipping the (bi-
nary) values of 10% or 20% randomly selected features, then
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(data record, class label) predict(data) (prediction, class label, “in” / “out”)
Shadow Training Set 1
Shadow Test Set 1
Shadow Model 1 “in” Prediction Set 1
“out” Prediction Set 1
··
·
··
·
··
·
Shadow Training Set k
Shadow Test Set k
Shadow Model k “in” Prediction Set k
“out” Prediction Set k
Attack Training Set Attack Model
train()
Fig. 3: Training the attack model on the inputs and outputs of the shadow models. For all records in the training dataset of a shadow model,
we query the model and obtain the output. These output vectors are labeled “in” and added to the attack model’s training dataset. We also
query the shadow model with a test dataset disjoint from its training dataset. The outputs on this set are labeled “out” and also added to the
attack model’s training dataset. Having constructed a dataset that reflects the black-box behavior of the shadow models on their training and
test datasets, we train a collection of ctarget attack models, one per each output class of the target model.
training our shadow models on the resulting noisy dataset.
This scenario models the case where the training data for the
target and shadow models are not sampled from exactly the
same population, or else sampled in a non-uniform way.
D. Training the attack model
The main idea behind our shadow training technique is that
similar models trained on relatively similar data records using
the same service behave in a similar way. This observation is
empirically borne out by our experiments in the rest of this
paper. Our results show that learning how to infer membership
in shadow models’ training datasets (for which we know the
ground truth and can easily compute the cost function during
supervised training) produces an attack model that successfully
infers membership in the target model’s training dataset, too.
We query each shadow model with its own training dataset
and with a disjoint test set of the same size. The outputs on
the training dataset are labeled “in,” the rest are labeled “out.”
Now, the attacker has a dataset of records, the corresponding
outputs of the shadow models, and the in/out labels. The
objective of the attack model is to infer the labels from the
records and corresponding outputs.
Figure 3 shows how to train the attack model. For all
(x, y) ∈ Dtrain
shadow i
, compute the prediction vector y =
f ishadow(x) and add the record (y,y, in) to the attack training
set Dtrainattack. Let D
test
shadow i
be a set of records disjoint from the
training set of the ith shadow model. Then, ∀(x, y) ∈ Dtest
shadow i
compute the prediction vector y = f ishadow(x) and add the
record (y,y, out) to the attack training set Dtrainattack. Finally,
split Dtrainattack into ctarget partitions, each associated with a
different class label. For each label y, train a separate model
that, given y, predicts the in or out membership status for x.
If we use model-based synthesis from Section V-C, all of
the raw training data for the attack model is drawn from
the records that are classified by the target model with high
confidence. This is true, however, both for the records used in
the shadow models’ training datasets and for the test records
left out of these datasets. Therefore, it is not the case that
the attack model simply learns to recognize inputs that are
classified with high confidence. Instead, it learns to perform
a much subtler task: how to distinguish between the training
inputs classified with high confidence and other, non-training
inputs that are also classified with high confidence.
In effect, we convert the problem of recognizing the com-
plex relationship between members of the training dataset and
the model’s output into a binary classification problem. Binary
classification is a standard machine learning task, thus we can
use any state-of-the-art machine learning framework or service
to build the attack model. Our approach is independent of the
specific method used for attack model training. For example,
in Section VI we construct the attack model using neural
networks and also using the same black-box Google Prediction
API that we are attacking, in which case we have no control
over the model structure, model parameters, or training meta-
parameters—but still obtain a working attack model.
VI. EVALUATION
We first describe the datasets that we use for evaluation,
followed by the description of the target models and our exper-
imental setup. We then present the results of our membership
inference attacks in several settings and study in detail how and
why the attacks work against different datasets and machine
learning platforms.
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A. Data
CIFAR. CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100 are benchmark datasets
used to evaluate image recognition algorithms [24]. CIFAR-10
is composed of 32×32 color images in 10 classes, with 6, 000
images per class. In total, there are 50, 000 training images
and 10, 000 test images. CIFAR-100 has the same format as
CIFAR-10, but it has 100 classes containing 600 images each.
There are 500 training images and 100 testing images per
class. We use different fractions of this dataset in our attack
experiments to show the effect of the training dataset size on
the accuracy of the attack.
Purchases. Our purchase dataset is based on Kaggle’s “ac-
quire valued shoppers” challenge dataset that contains shop-
ping histories for several thousand individuals.6 The purpose
of the challenge is to design accurate coupon promotion
strategies. Each user record contains his or her transactions
over a year. The transactions include many fields such as
product name, store chain, quantity, and date of purchase.
For our experiments, we derived a simplified purchase
dataset (with 197, 324 records), where each record consists
of 600 binary features. Each feature corresponds to a product
and represents whether the user has purchased it or not. To
design our classification tasks, we first cluster the records
into multiple classes, each representing a different purchase
style. In our experiments, we use 5 different classification
tasks with a different number of classes {2, 10, 20, 50, 100}.
The classification task is to predict the purchase style of a
user given the 600-feature vector. We use 10, 000 randomly
selected records from the purchase dataset to train the target
model. The rest of the dataset contributes to the test set and
(if necessary) the training sets of the shadow models.
Locations. We created a location dataset from the publicly
available set of mobile users’ location “check-ins” in the
Foursquare social network, restricted to the Bangkok area
and collected from April 2012 to September 2013 [36].7 The
check-in dataset contains 11, 592 users and 119, 744 locations,
for a total of 1, 136, 481 check-ins. We filtered out users with
fewer than 25 check-ins and venues with fewer than 100 visits,
which left us with 5, 010 user profiles. For each location venue,
we have the geographical position as well as its location type
(e.g., Indian restaurant, fast food, etc.). The total number of
location types is 128. We partition the Bangkok map into areas
of size 0.5km × 0.5km, yielding 318 regions for which we
have at least one user check-in.
Each record in the resulting dataset has 446 binary features,
representing whether the user visited a certain region or
location type, i.e., the user’s semantic and geographical profile.
The classification task is similar to the purchase dataset. We
cluster the location dataset into 30 classes, each representing
a different geosocial type. The classification task is to predict
the user’s geosocial type given his or her record. We use 1, 600
randomly selected records to train the target model. The rest
6https://kaggle.com/c/acquire-valued-shoppers-challenge/data
7https://sites.google.com/site/yangdingqi/home/foursquare-dataset
of the dataset contributes to the test set and (if necessary) the
training sets of the shadow models.
Texas hospital stays. This dataset is based on the Hospital
Discharge Data public use files with information about inpa-
tients stays in several health facilities,8 released by the Texas
Department of State Health Services from 2006 to 2009. Each
record contains four main groups of attributes: the external
causes of injury (e.g., suicide, drug misuse), the diagnosis
(e.g., schizophrenia, illegal abortion), the procedures the pa-
tient underwent (e.g., surgery) and some generic information
such as the gender, age, race, hospital id, and length of stay.
Our classification task is to predict the patient’s main proce-
dure based on the attributes other than secondary procedures.
We focus on the 100 most frequent procedures. The resulting
dataset has 67, 330 records and 6, 170 binary features. We use
10, 000 randomly selected records to train the target model.
Note that our experiments do not involve re-identification
of known individuals and fully comply with the data use
agreement for the original Public Use Data File.
MNIST. This is a dataset of 70, 000 handwritten digits
formatted as 32 × 32 images and normalized so that the
digits are located at the center of the image.9 We use 10, 000
randomly selected images to train the target model.
UCI Adult (Census Income). This dataset includes 48, 842
records with 14 attributes such as age, gender, education,
marital status, occupation, working hours, and native country.
The (binary) classification task is to predict if a person makes
over $50K a year based on the census attributes.10 We use
10, 000 randomly selected records to train the target model.
B. Target models
We evaluated our inference attacks on three types of target
models: two constructed by cloud-based “machine learning as
a service” platforms and one we implemented locally. In all
cases, our attacks treat the models as black boxes. For the
cloud services, we do not know the type or structure of the
models they create, nor the values of the hyper-parameters
used during the training process.
Machine learning as a service. The first cloud-based machine
learning service in our study is Google Prediction API. With
this service, the user uploads a dataset and obtains an API
for querying the resulting model. There are no configuration
parameters that can be changed by the user.
The other cloud service is Amazon ML. The user cannot
choose the type of the model but can control a few meta-
parameters. In our experiments, we varied the maximum num-
ber of passes over the training data and L2 regularization
amount. The former determines the number of training epochs
and controls the convergence of model training; its default
value is 10. The latter tunes how much regularization is per-
formed on the model parameters in order to avoid overfitting.
8https://www.dshs.texas.gov/THCIC/Hospitals/Download.shtm
9http://yann.lecun.com/exdb/mnist
10http://archive.ics.uci.edu/ml/datasets/Adult
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Fig. 4: Precision of the membership inference attack against neural networks trained on CIFAR datasets. The graphs show precision for
different classes while varying the size of the training datasets. The median values are connected across different training set sizes. The
median precision (from the smallest dataset size to largest) is 0.78, 0.74, 0.72, 0.71 for CIFAR-10 and 1, 1, 0.98, 0.97 for CIFAR-100. Recall
is almost 1 for both datasets. The figure on the left shows the per-class precision (for CIFAR-10). Random guessing accuracy is 0.5.
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Fig. 5: Empirical CDF of the precision and recall of the membership inference attack against different classes of the models trained using
Amazon ML (in two different configurations) and Google Prediction API on 10, 000 purchase records. 50, 75, 90-percentile of precision is
0.74, 0.79, 0.84 on Amazon (10, 1e − 6), 0.84, 0.88, 0.91 on Amazon (100, 1e − 4), and 0.94, 0.97, 1 on Google, respectively. Recall is
close to 1.
We used the platform in two configurations: the default setting
(10, 1e− 6) and (100, 1e− 4).
Neural networks. Neural networks have become a very
popular approach to large-scale machine learning. We use
Torch7 and its nn packages,11 a deep-learning library that has
been used and extended by major Internet companies such as
Facebook.12
On CIFAR datasets, we train a standard convolutional neural
network (CNN) with two convolution and max pooling layers
plus a fully connected layer of size 128 and a SoftMax layer.
We use Tanh as the activation function. We set the learning
rate to 0.001, the learning rate decay to 1e − 07, and the
maximum epochs of training to 100.
On the purchase dataset (see Section VI-A), we train a fully
connected neural network with one hidden layer of size 128
and a SoftMax layer. We use Tanh as the activation function.
We set the learning rate to 0.001, the learning rate decay to
1e− 07, and the maximum epochs of training to 200.
11https://github.com/torch/nn
12https://github.com/facebook/fblualib
C. Experimental setup
The training set and the test set of each target and shadow
model are randomly selected from the respective datasets, have
the same size, and are disjoint. There is no overlap between the
datasets of the target model and those of the shadow models,
but the datasets used for different shadow models can overlap
with each other.
We set the training set size to 10, 000 for the purchase
dataset as well as the Texas hospital-stay dataset, Adult dataset
and the MNIST dataset. We set it to 1, 200 for the location
dataset. We vary the size of the training set for the CIFAR
datasets, to measure the difference in the attack accuracy.
For the CIFAR-10 dataset, we choose 2, 500; 5, 000; 10, 000;
and 15, 000. For the CIFAR-100 dataset, we choose 4, 600;
10, 520; 19, 920; and 29, 540.
The experiments on the CIFAR datasets were run lo-
cally, against our own models, so we can vary the model’s
configuration and measure the impact on the attack accu-
racy. The experiments on the other datasets (purchases with
{2, 10, 20, 50, 100} classes, Texas hospital stays, locations,
Adult, and MNIST) were run against models trained using
either Google or Amazon services, where we have no visibility
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Fig. 6: Precision and recall of the membership inference attack against
the classification model trained using Google Prediction API on the
Texas hospital-stay dataset.
into their choice of the model type and structure and little
control over the training process (see Section VI-B).
For the purchase dataset, we built target models on all plat-
forms (Google, Amazon, local neural networks) employing the
same training dataset, thus enabling us to compare the leakage
from different models. We used similar training architectures
for the attack models across different platforms: either a fully
connected neural network with one hidden layer of size 64
with ReLU (rectifier linear units) activation functions and a
SoftMax layer, or a Google-trained black-box model.
We set the number of shadow models to 100 for the CIFAR
datasets, 20 for the purchase dataset, 10 for the Texas hospital-
stay dataset, 60 for the location dataset, 50 for the MNIST
dataset, and 20 for the Adult dataset. Increasing the number
of shadow models would increase the accuracy of the attack
but also its cost.
D. Accuracy of the attack
The attacker’s goal is to determine whether a given record
was part of the target model’s training dataset. We evaluate
this attack by executing it on randomly reshuffled records from
the target’s training and test datasets. In our attack evaluation,
we use sets of the same size (i.e, equal number of members
and non-members) in order to maximize the uncertainty of
inference, thus the baseline accuracy is 0.5.
We evaluate the attack using the standard precision and
recall metrics. Precision is the fraction of the records inferred
as members of the training dataset that are indeed members.
Recall measures coverage of the attack, i.e., the fraction of
the training records that the attacker can correctly infer as
members. Most measurements are reported per class because
the accuracy of the attack can vary considerably for different
classes. This is due to the difference in size and composition
of the training data belonging to each class and highly depends
on the dataset.
The test accuracy of our target neural-network models with
the largest training datasets (15, 000 and 29, 540 records,
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Fig. 7: Precision of the membership inference attack against models
trained on the same datasets but using different platforms. The attack
model is a neural network.
respectively) is 0.6 and 0.2 for CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100,
respectively. The accuracy is low, indicating that the models
are heavily overfitted on their training sets. Figure 4 shows
the results of the membership inference attack against the
CIFAR models. For both CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100, the
attack performs much better than the baseline, with CIFAR-
100 especially vulnerable.
Table I shows the training and test accuracy of the models
constructed using different machine learning platforms for the
purchase dataset with 100 classes. Large gaps between training
and test accuracy indicate overfitting. Larger test accuracy
indicates better generalizability and higher predictive power.
Figure 5 shows the results of the membership inference
attack against the black-box models trained by Google’s and
Amazon’s machine learning platforms. Figure 7 compares
precision of the attacks against these models with the attacks
against a neural-network model trained on the same data. Mod-
els trained using Google Prediction API exhibit the biggest
leakage.
For the Texas hospital-stay dataset, we evaluated our attack
against a Google-trained model. The training accuracy of the
target model is 0.66 and its test accuracy is 0.51. Figure 6
shows the accuracy of membership inference. Precision is
mostly above 0.6, and for half of the classes, it is above 0.7.
Precision is above 0.85 for more than 20 classes.
For the location dataset, we evaluated our attacks against
a Google-trained model. The training accuracy of the target
model is 1 and its test accuracy is 0.66. Figure 8 shows the
accuracy of membership inference. Precision is between 0.6
and 0.8, with an almost constant recall of 1.
E. Effect of the shadow training data
Figure 8 reports precision of the attacks trained on the
shadow models whose training datasets are noisy versions of
the real data (disjoint from the target model’s training dataset
but sampled from the same population). Precision drops as the
amount of noise increases, but the attack still outperforms the
9
ML Platform Training Test
Google 0.999 0.656
Amazon (10,1e-6) 0.941 0.468
Amazon (100,1e-4) 1.00 0.504
Neural network 0.830 0.670
TABLE I: Training and test accuracy of the models constructed using
different ML-as-a-service platforms on the purchase dataset (with 100
classes).
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Fig. 8: Empirical CDF of the precision of the membership inference
attack against the Google-trained model for the location dataset.
Results are shown for the shadow models trained on real data and for
the shadow models trained on noisy data with 10% and 20% noise
(i.e., x% of features are replaced with random values). Precision of
the attack over all classes is 0.678 (real data), 0.666 (data with 10%
noise), and 0.613 (data with 20% noise). The corresponding recall
of the attack is 0.98, 0.99, and 1.00, respectively.
baseline and, even with 10% of the features in the shadows’
training data replaced by random values, matches the original
attack. This demonstrates that our attacks are robust even
if the attacker’s assumptions about the distribution of the
target model’s training data are not very accurate.
Figure 9 reports precision of the attacks when the attacker
has no real data (not even noisy) for training his shadow mod-
els. Instead, we used the marginal distributions of individual
features to generate 187, 300 synthetic purchase records, then
trained 20 shadow models on these records.
We also generated 30, 000 synthetic records using the
model-based approach presented in Algorithm 1. In our ex-
periments with the purchase dataset where records have 600
binary features, we initialize k to kmax = 128 and divide it
by 2 when rejmax = 10 subsequent proposals are rejected.
We set its minimum value kmin = 4. In the sampling phase,
we set the minimum confidence threshold confmin to 0.2.
For our final set of sampled records, the target model’s
confidence in classifying the records is 0.24 on average (just
a bit over our threshold confmin = 0.2). On average, each
synthetic record needed 156 queries (of proposed records)
during our hill-climbing two-phase process (see Section V-C).
We trained 8 shadow models on this data.
Figure 9 compares precision of the attacks when shadow
models are trained on real data versus shadow models trained
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Fig. 9: Empirical CDF of the precision of the membership inference
attack against the Google-trained model for the purchase dataset.
Results are shown for different ways of generating training data for
the shadow models (real, synthetic generated from the target model,
synthetic generated from marginal statistics). Precision of the attack
over all classes is 0.935 (real data), 0.795 (marginal-based synthetic
data), and 0.896 (model-based synthetic data). The corresponding
recall of the attack is 0.994, 0.991, and 0.526, respectively.
on synthetic data. The overall precision is 0.935 on real data
compared to 0.795 for marginal-based synthetics and 0.895
for model-based synthetics. The accuracy of the attack using
marginal-based synthetic data is noticeably reduced versus real
data, but is nevertheless very high for most classes. The attack
using model-based synthetic data exhibits dual behavior. For
most classes its precision is high and close to the attacks
that use real data for shadow training, but for a few classes
precision is very low (less than 0.1).
The reason for the attack’s low precision on some classes
is that the target classifier cannot confidently model the dis-
tribution of data records belonging to these classes—because
it has not seen enough examples. These classes are under-
represented in the target model’s training dataset. For example,
each of the classes where the attack has less than 0.1 precision
contributes under 0.6% of the target model’s training dataset.
Some of these classes have fewer than 30 training records (out
of 10, 000). This makes it very difficult for our algorithm to
synthesize representatives of these classes when searching the
high-dimensional space of possible records.
For the majority of the target model’s classes, our attack
achieves high precision. This demonstrates that a membership
inference attack can be trained with only black-box access
to the target model, without any prior knowledge about
the distribution of the target model’s training data if the
attacker can efficiently generate inputs that are classified by
the target model with high confidence.
F. Effect of the number of classes and training data per class
The number of output classes of the target model contributes
to how much the model leaks. The more classes, the more
signals about the internal state of the model are available to
the attacker. This is one of the reasons why the results in Fig. 4
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Fig. 10: Precision of the membership inference attack against differ-
ent purchase classification models trained on the Google platform.
The boxplots show the distribution of precision over different classi-
fication tasks (with a different number of classes).
are better for CIFAR-100 than for CIFAR-10. The CIFAR-
100 model is also more overfitted to its training dataset. For
the same number of training records per class, the attack
performs better against CIFAR-100 than against CIFAR-10.
For example, compare CIFAR-10 when the size of the training
dataset is 2, 000 with CIFAR-100 when the size of the training
dataset is 20, 000. The average number of data records per
class is 200 in both cases, but the attack accuracy is much
better (close to 1) for CIFAR-100.
To quantify the effect that the number of classes has
on the accuracy of the attack, we trained target models
using Google Prediction API on the purchase dataset with
{2, 10, 20, 50, 100} classes. Figure 10 shows the distribution
of attack precision for each model. Models with fewer classes
leak less information about their training inputs. As the
number of classes increases, the model needs to extract more
distinctive features from the data to be able to classify inputs
with high accuracy. Informally, models with more output
classes need to remember more about their training data, thus
they leak more information.
Figure 11 shows the relationship between the amount of
training data per class and the accuracy of membership infer-
ence. This relationship is more complex, but, in general, the
more data in the training dataset is associated with a given
class, the lower the attack precision for that class.
Table II shows the precision of membership inference
against Google-trained models. For the MNIST dataset, the
training accuracy of the target model is 0.984 and its test
accuracy is 0.928. The overall precision of the membership
inference attack is 0.517, which is just slightly above random
guessing. The lack of randomness in the training data for each
class and the small number of classes contribute to the failure
of the attack.
For the Adult dataset, the training accuracy of the target
model is 0.848 and its test accuracy is 0.842. The overall
precision of the attack is 0.503, which is equivalent to random
Dataset Training Testing Attack
Accuracy Accuracy Precision
Adult 0.848 0.842 0.503
MNIST 0.984 0.928 0.517
Location 1.000 0.673 0.678
Purchase (2) 0.999 0.984 0.505
Purchase (10) 0.999 0.866 0.550
Purchase (20) 1.000 0.781 0.590
Purchase (50) 1.000 0.693 0.860
Purchase (100) 0.999 0.659 0.935
TX hospital stays 0.668 0.517 0.657
TABLE II: Accuracy of the Google-trained models and the corre-
sponding attack precision.
guessing. There could be two reasons for why membership
inference fails against this model. First, the model is not
overfitted (its test and train accuracies are almost the same).
Second, the model is a binary classifier, which means that the
attacker has to distinguish members from non-members by
observing the behavior of the model on essentially 1 signal,
since the two outputs are complements of each other. This
is not enough for our attack to extract useful membership
information from the model.
G. Effect of overfitting
The more overfitted a model, the more it leaks—but only
for models of the same type. For example, the Amazon-
trained (100, 1e−4) model that, according to Table I, is more
overfitted leaks more than the Amazon-trained (10, 1e − 6)
model. However, they both leak less than the Google-trained
model, even though the Google model is less overfitted than
one of the Amazon models and has a much better predictive
power (and thus generalizability) than both Amazon models.
Therefore, overfitting is not the only factor that causes
a model to be vulnerable to membership inference. The
structure and type of the model also contribute to the problem.
In Figure 11, we look deeper into the factors that contribute
to attack accuracy per class, including how overfitted the
model is and what fraction of the training data belongs to each
class. The (train-test) accuracy gap is the difference between
the accuracy of the target model on its training and test data.
Similar metrics are used in the literature to measure how
overfitted a model is [18]. We compute this metric for each
class. Bigger gaps indicate that the model is overfitted on its
training data for that class. The plots show that, as expected,
bigger (train-test) accuracy gaps are associated with higher
precision of membership inference.
VII. WHY OUR ATTACKS WORK
Table II shows the relationship between the accuracy of
our membership inference attack and the (train-test) gap of
the target models. Figure 12 also illustrates how the target
models’ outputs distinguish members of their training datasets
from the non-members. This is the information that our attack
exploits.
Specifically, we look at how accurately the model predicts
the correct label as well as its prediction uncertainty. The ac-
curacy for class i is the probability that the model classifies an
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Fig. 11: Relationship between the precision of the membership inference attack on a class and the (train-test) accuracy gap of the target
model, as well as the fraction of the training dataset that belongs to this class. Each point represent the values for one class. The (train-test)
accuracy gap is a metric for generalization error [18] and an indicator of how overfitted the target model is.
 0
 0.2
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
 1
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
Prediction Uncertainty
Purchase Dataset, 10 Classes, Google, Membership Inference Attack
Members
Non-members
 0
 0.2
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
 1
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
Prediction Uncertainty
Purchase Dataset, 20 Classes, Google, Membership Inference Attack
Members
Non-members
 0
 0.2
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
 1
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
Prediction Uncertainty
Purchase Dataset, 100 Classes, Google, Membership Inference Attack
Members
Non-members
 0
 0.2
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
 1
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
Prediction Accuracy
Purchase Dataset, 10 Classes, Google, Membership Inference Attack
Members
Non-members
 0
 0.2
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
 1
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
Prediction Accuracy
Purchase Dataset, 20 Classes, Google, Membership Inference Attack
Members
Non-members
 0
 0.2
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
 1
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
Prediction Accuracy
Purchase Dataset, 100 Classes, Google, Membership Inference Attack
Members
Non-members
Fig. 12: Classification uncertainty (top row) and prediction accuracy (bottom row) of the target model for the members of its training dataset
vs. non-members, visualized for several sample classes. The difference between the member and non-member output distributions is among
the factors that our attack exploits to infer membership. The accuracy of our attack is higher for the models where the two distributions are
more distinguishable (See Table II).
input with label i as i. Prediction uncertainty is the normalized
entropy of the model’s prediction vector: −1log(n)
∑
i pi log(pi),
where pi is the probability that the input belongs to class i,
and n is the number of classes. The plots show that there
is an observable difference between the output (both accuracy
and uncertainty) of the model on the member inputs versus the
non-member inputs in the cases where our attack is successful.
Success of membership inference is directly related to the
(1) generalizability of the target model and (2) diversity of its
training data. If the model overfits and does not generalize well
to inputs beyond its training data, or if the training data is not
representative, the model leaks information about its training
inputs. We quantify this relationship in Fig. 11. From the
machine learning perspective, overfitting is harmful because
it produces models that lack predictive power. In this paper,
we show another harm of overfitting: the leakage of sensitive
information about the training data.
As we explained in Section VI, overfitting is not the only
reason why our inference attacks work. Different machine
learning models, due to their different structures, “remember”
different amounts of information about their training datasets.
This leads to different amounts of information leakage even if
the models are overfitted to the same degree (see Table I).
VIII. MITIGATION
As explained in Section VII, overfitting is an important
(but not the only) reason why machine learning models leak
information about their training datasets. Of course, overfitting
is a canonical problem in machine learning because it limits
the predictive power and generalizability of models. This
means that instead of the usual tradeoff between utility and
privacy, machine learning research and privacy research have
similar objectives in this case. Regularization techniques such
as dropout [31] can help defeat overfitting and also strengthen
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privacy guarantees in neural networks [23]. Regularization is
also used for objective perturbation in differentially private
machine learning [9].
(Ideal) well-regularized models should not leak much infor-
mation about their training data, and our attack can serve as
a metric to quantify this. Also, models with a trivial structure
(e.g., XOR of some input features) generalize to the entire
universe and do not leak information.
If the training process is differentially private [12], the
probability of producing a given model from a training dataset
that includes a particular record is close to the probability of
producing the same model when this record is not included.
Differentially private models are, by construction, secure
against membership inference attacks of the kind developed in
this paper because our attacks operate solely on the outputs of
the model, without any auxiliary information. One obstacle is
that differentially private models may significantly reduce the
model’s prediction accuracy for small  values. In Section IX,
we survey some of the related work in this area.
In the case of machine learning as a service, platform
operators such as Google and Amazon have significant re-
sponsibility to the users of their services. In their current
form, these services simply accept the data, produce a model
of unknown type and structure, and return an opaque API to
this model that data owners use as they see fit, without any
understanding that by doing so, they may be leaking out their
data. Machine learning services do not inform their customers
about the risks of overfitting or the harm that may result
from models trained on inadequate datasets (for example, with
unrepresentative records or too few representatives for certain
classes).
Instead, when adaptively choosing a model for a customer-
supplied dataset, services such as Google Prediction API and
Amazon ML should take into account not only the accuracy of
the model but also the risk that it will leak information about
its training data. Furthermore, they need to explicitly warn
customers about this risk and provide more visibility into the
model and the methods that can be used to reduce this leakage.
Our inference attacks can be used as metrics to quantify
leakage from a specific model, and also to measure the
effectiveness of future privacy protection techniques deployed
by machine-learning services.
A. Mitigation strategies
We quantitatively evaluate several defenses against mem-
bership inference.
Restrict the prediction vector to top k classes. When the
number of classes is large, many classes may have very small
probabilities in the model’s prediction vector. The model will
still be useful if it only outputs the probabilities of the most
likely k classes. To implement this, we add a filter to the last
layer of the model. The smaller k is, the less information the
model leaks. In the extreme case, the model returns only the
label of the most likely class without reporting its probability.
Coarsen precision of the prediction vector. To implement
this, we round the classification probabilities in the prediction
Purchase dataset Testing Attack Attack Attack
Accuracy Total Accuracy Precision Recall
No Mitigation 0.66 0.92 0.87 1.00
Top k = 3 0.66 0.92 0.87 0.99
Top k = 1 0.66 0.89 0.83 1.00
Top k = 1 label 0.66 0.66 0.60 0.99
Rounding d = 3 0.66 0.92 0.87 0.99
Rounding d = 1 0.66 0.89 0.83 1.00
Temperature t = 5 0.66 0.88 0.86 0.93
Temperature t = 20 0.66 0.84 0.83 0.86
L2 λ = 1e− 4 0.68 0.87 0.81 0.96
L2 λ = 1e− 3 0.72 0.77 0.73 0.86
L2 λ = 1e− 2 0.63 0.53 0.54 0.52
Hospital dataset Testing Attack Attack Attack
Accuracy Total Accuracy Precision Recall
No Mitigation 0.55 0.83 0.77 0.95
Top k = 3 0.55 0.83 0.77 0.95
Top k = 1 0.55 0.82 0.76 0.95
Top k = 1 label 0.55 0.73 0.67 0.93
Rounding d = 3 0.55 0.83 0.77 0.95
Rounding d = 1 0.55 0.81 0.75 0.96
Temperature t = 5 0.55 0.79 0.77 0.83
Temperature t = 20 0.55 0.76 0.76 0.76
L2 λ = 1e− 4 0.56 0.80 0.74 0.92
L2 λ = 5e− 4 0.57 0.73 0.69 0.86
L2 λ = 1e− 3 0.56 0.66 0.64 0.73
L2 λ = 5e− 3 0.35 0.52 0.52 0.53
TABLE III: The accuracy of the target models with different mitiga-
tion techniques on the purchase and Texas hospital-stay datasets (both
with 100 classes), as well as total accuracy, precision, and recall of
the membership inference attack. The relative reduction in the metrics
for the attack shows the effectiveness of the mitigation strategy.
vector down to d floating point digits. The smaller d is, the
less information the model leaks.
Increase entropy of the prediction vector. One of the signals
that membership inference exploits is the difference between
the prediction entropy of the target model on its training inputs
versus other inputs. As a mitigation technique for neural-
network models, we can modify (or add) the softmax layer and
increase its normalizing temperature t > 0. The softmax layer
converts the logits computed for each class into probabilities.
For the logits vector z, the ith output of the softmax function
with temperature t is e
zi/t∑
j e
zj/t
. This technique, also used
in knowledge distillation and information transfer between
models [20], would increase the entropy of the prediction
vector. Note that for a very large temperature, the output
becomes almost uniform and independent of its input, thus
leaking no information.
Use regularization. Regularization techniques are used to
overcome overfitting in machine learning. We use L2-norm
standard regularization that penalizes large parameters by
adding λ
∑
i θ
2
i to the model’s loss function, where θis are
model’s parameters. We implement this technique with various
values for the regularization factor λ. The larger λ is, the
stronger the effect of regularization during the training.
B. Evaluation of mitigation strategies
To evaluate the effectiveness of different mitigation strate-
gies, we implemented all of them in locally trained mod-
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els over which we have full control. The inference attack,
however, still assumes only black-box access to the resulting
models. The baseline model for these experiments is a neural
network with one hidden layer with 256 units (for the purchase
dataset) and 1,000 units (for the Texas hospital-stay dataset).
We use Tanh as the activation function.
Table III shows the results of our evaluation. It compares
different mitigation strategies based on how they degrade the
accuracy of our attack relative to the attack on a model
that does not use any mitigation. The mitigation strategies
that we implemented did not impose any cost on the target
model’s prediction accuracy, and in the case of regularization,
the target model’s prediction accuracy increased as expected.
Note that more regularization (by increasing λ even further)
would potentially result in a significant reduction of the target
model’s test accuracy, even if it foils membership inference.
This is shown in the table for λ = 1e − 2 on the purchase
dataset, and for λ = 5e−3 on the Texas hospital stay dataset.
Overall, our attack is robust against these mitigation strate-
gies. Filtering out low-probability classes from the predic-
tion vector and limiting the vector to the top 1 or 3 most
likely classes does not foil the attack. Even restricting the
prediction vector to a single label (most likely class),
which is the absolute minimum a model must output to
remain useful, is not enough to fully prevent membership
inference. Our attack can still exploit the mislabeling behavior
of the target model because members and non-members of
the training dataset are mislabeled differently (assigned to
different wrong classes). If the prediction vector contains
probabilities in addition to the labels, the model leaks even
more information that can be used for membership inference.
Some of the mitigation methods are not suitable for
machine-learning-as-service APIs used by general applications
and services. Regularization, however, appears to be neces-
sary and useful. As mentioned above, it (1) generalizes the
model and improves its predictive power and (2) decreases
the model’s information leakage about its training dataset.
However, regularization needs to be deployed carefully to
avoid damaging the model’s performance on the test datasets.
IX. RELATED WORK
Attacks on statistical and machine learning models. In [2],
knowledge of the parameters of SVM and HMM models is
used to infer general statistical information about the training
dataset, for example, whether records of a particular race were
used during training. By contrast, our inference attacks work
in a black-box setting, without any knowledge of the model’s
parameters, and infer information about specific records in the
training dataset, as opposed to general statistics.
Homer et al. [21] developed a technique, which was further
studied in [3], [15], for inferring the presence of a particular
genome in a dataset, based on comparing the published statis-
tics about this dataset (in particular, minor allele frequencies)
to the distribution of these statistics in the general population.
By contrast, our inference attacks target trained machine
learning models, not explicit statistics.
Fig. 13: Images produced by model inversion on a trained CIFAR-10
model. Top: airplane, automobile, bird, cat, deer. Bottom: dog, frog,
horse, ship, truck. The images do not correspond to any specific
image from the training dataset, are not human-recognizable, and at
best (e.g., the truck class image) are vaguely similar to the average
image of all objects in a given class.
Other attacks on machine learning include [7], where the
adversary exploits changes in the outputs of a collaborative
recommender system to infer inputs that caused these changes.
These attacks exploit temporal behavior specific to the recom-
mender systems based on collaborative filtering.
Model inversion. Model inversion [16], [17] uses the output
of a model applied to a hidden input to infer certain features
of this input. See [27] for a detailed analysis of this attack and
an explanation of why it does not necessarily entail a privacy
breach. For example, in the specific case of pharmacogenetics
analyzed in [17], the model captures the correlation between
the patient’s genotype and the dosage of a certain medicine.
This correlation is a valid scientific fact that holds for all
patients, regardless of whether they were included in the
model’s training dataset or not. It is not possible to prevent
disclosure due to population statistics [14].
In general, model inversion cannot tell whether a particular
record was used as part of the model’s training dataset. Given
a record and a model, model inversion works exactly the same
way when the record was used to train the model and when
it was not used. In the case of pharmacogenetics [17], model
inversion produces almost identical results for members and
non-members. Due to the overfitting of the model, the results
are a little (4%) more accurate for the members, but this
accuracy can only be measured in retrospect, if the adversary
already knows the ground truth (i.e., which records are indeed
members of the model’s training dataset). By contrast, our goal
is to construct a decision procedure that distinguishes members
from non-members.
Model inversion has also been applied to face recognition
models [16]. In this scenario, the model’s output is set to 1
for class i and 0 for the rest, and model inversion is used to
construct an input that produces these outputs. This input is
not an actual member of the training dataset but simply an
average of the features that “characterize” the class.
In the face recognition scenario—and only in this specific
scenario—each output class of the model is associated with a
single person. All training images for this class are different
photos of that person, thus model inversion constructs an
artificial image that is an average of these photos. Because
they all depict the same person, this average is recognizable
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(by a human) as that person. Critically, model inversion does
not produce any specific image from the training dataset, which
is the definition of membership inference.
If the images in a class are diverse (e.g., if the class contains
multiple individuals or many different objects), the results of
model inversion as used in [16] are semantically meaningless
and not recognizable as any specific image from the training
dataset. To illustrate this, we ran model inversion against
a convolutional neural network13 trained on the CIFAR-10
dataset, which is a standard benchmark for object recognition
models. Each class includes different images of a single type
of object (e.g., an airplane). Figure 13 shows the images
“reconstructed” by model inversion. As expected, they do not
depict any recognizable object, let alone an image from the
training dataset. We expect similar results for other models,
too. For the pharmacogenetics model mentioned above, this
form of model inversion produces an average of different
patients’ genomes. For the model that classifies location traces
into geosocial profiles (see Section VI-A), it produces an
average of the location traces of different people. In both
cases, the results of model inversion are not associated with
any specific individual or specific training input.
In summary, model inversion produces the average of the
features that at best can characterize an entire output class.
It does not (1) construct a specific member of the training
dataset, nor (2) given an input and a model, determines if this
specific input was used to train the model.
Model extraction. Model extraction attacks [32] aim to
extract the parameters of a model trained on private data.
The attacker’s goal is to construct a model whose predictive
performance on validation data is similar to the target model.
Model extraction can be a stepping stone for inferring
information about the model’s training dataset. In [32], this is
illustrated for a specific type of models called kernel logistic
regression (KLR) [38]. In KLR models, the kernel function
includes a tiny fraction of the training data (so called “import
points”) directly into the model. Since import points are
parameters of the model, extracting them results in the leakage
of that particular part of the data. This result is very specific
to KLR and does not extend to other types of models since
they do not explicitly store training data in their parameters.
Even for KLR models, leakage is not quantified other than
via visual similarity of a few chosen import points and “the
closest (in L1 norm) extracted representers” on the MNIST
dataset of handwritten digits. In MNIST, all members of a
class are very similar (e.g., all members of the first class are
different ways of writing digit “1”). Thus, any extracted digit
must be similar to all images in its class, whether this digit
was in the training set or not.
Privacy-preserving machine learning. Existing literature on
privacy protection in machine learning focuses mostly on how
to learn without direct access to the training data. Secure
multiparty computation (SMC) has been used for learning
decision trees [26], linear regression functions [11], Naive
13https://github.com/Lasagne/Recipes/blob/master/modelzoo/cifar10 nin.py
Bayes classifiers [33], and k-means clustering [22]. The goal
is to limit information leakage during training. The training
algorithm is the same as in the non-privacy-preserving case,
thus the resulting models are as vulnerable to inference attacks
as any conventionally trained model. This also holds for the
models trained by computing on encrypted data [4], [6], [35].
Differential privacy [12] has been applied to linear and
logistic regression [8], [37], support vector machines [28], risk
minimization [5], [9], [34], deep learning [1], [30], learning
an unknown probability distribution over a discrete population
from random samples [10], and releasing hyper-parameters
and classifier accuracy [25]. By definition, differentially pri-
vate models limit the success probability of membership
inference attacks based solely on the model, which includes
the attacks described in this paper.
X. CONCLUSIONS
We have designed, implemented, and evaluated the first
membership inference attack against machine learning models,
notably black-box models trained in the cloud using Google
Prediction API and Amazon ML. Our attack is a general,
quantitative approach to understanding how machine learning
models leak information about their training datasets. When
choosing the type of the model to train or a machine learning
service to use, our attack can be used as one of the selection
metrics.
Our key technical innovation is the shadow training tech-
nique that trains an attack model to distinguish the target
model’s outputs on members versus non-members of its train-
ing dataset. We demonstrate that shadow models used in this
attack can be effectively created using synthetic or noisy data.
In the case of synthetic data generated from the target model
itself, the attack does not require any prior knowledge about
the distribution of the target model’s training data.
Membership in hospital-stay and other health-care datasets
is sensitive from the privacy perspective. Therefore, our results
have substantial practical privacy implications.
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